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BRUMFIELD V. CAIN: DEVELOPING A 
MATTER OF DISABILITY AND DEATH 
Stesha Turney 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
While the virtues of the death penalty have long been in 
dispute,1 few would disagree that this punishment should be reserved 
for the most morally culpable offenders and that there should be 
procedural safeguards in place to ensure that only those people are 
executed.2 Usually, when a crime is punishable by death, the 
prosecutor decides whether to seek the death penalty, and the jury 
determines whether such punishment is appropriate after hearing 
both evidence of the defendant’s culpability and evidence that the 
defendant’s culpability is mitigated in some way.3 The Constitution 
limits the application of this procedure. Under the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the 
Supreme Court has deemed certain categories of individuals 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science and 
European Studies, June 2010, University of Washington. The author expresses her gratitude to 
Professor Sean Kennedy for his valuable guidance and insights throughout the drafting of this 
Comment. She also thanks the members of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their 
diligence in production. 
 1. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–84 (1976) (describing jury verdicts 
and death penalty legislation as indicia of public opinion in favor of the death penalty, and 
leaving attempts to evaluate the death penalty’s effectiveness in achieving penological goals to 
the legislature). 
 2. Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus 
Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1997) (“Most would agree at least . . . in the abstract with the importance of process: 
a proceeding conducted in accordance with established rules, presided over by an impartial judge, 
in which the accused is capably represented by a competent lawyer . . . . The legal system 
supposedly strives to provide this sort of process.”); see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (“There is no 
question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. When a 
defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly sensitive to [ensure] that every 
safeguard is observed . . . . It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting another source)). 
 3. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
arts. 905.2–.4 (2012); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.9(a)(2). 
504 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:503 
ineligible for execution,4 primarily because execution of such 
individuals would not serve the penological goals of capital 
punishment: deterrence and retribution. 
In Atkins v. Virginia,5 the Supreme Court held the intellectually 
disabled6 to be among those constitutionally ineligible for the death 
penalty.7 The Court left to the states the critical responsibility of 
defining intellectual disability and establishing procedures to 
implement the exemption embodied in Atkins.8 
The lack of Supreme Court holdings on the procedures required 
to effectuate Atkins has caused those petitioners claiming to be 
intellectually disabled to face disparate requirements—and therefore 
inconsistent treatment—across the states.9 This inequality increases 
the need for federal habeas review of the denial of Atkins relief to 
ensure petitioners’ constitutional rights are protected. Yet without 
Supreme Court precedent, federal courts are poorly equipped to 
remedy state court constitutional shortcomings on habeas review.10 
This quagmire results from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Supreme Court’s 
 
 4. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding capital punishment 
unconstitutional for juvenile offenders); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986) (holding 
capital punishment unconstitutional for insane offenders). 
 5. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 6. The condition now known as intellectual disability was formerly called “mental 
retardation.” See id. While the medical community, legislatures, and the majority of the Court 
have changed their terminology accordingly, others have not. Compare Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 
1986, 1990 (2014) (explaining the change in terminology), and Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 
2269, 2274 n.1 (2015) (same), and Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual Disability, 
AAIDD, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intellectual-disability (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2016) (same), and Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) 
(enacting the same terminology change in many areas of federal law), with Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2288 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to the same condition as “mental retardation”). 
 7. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 8. Id. at 317. 
 9. See Natalie Cheung, Defining Intellectual Disability and Establishing a Standard of 
Proof: Suggestions for a National Model Standard, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 319 (2013); see 
generally Kathryn Raffensperger, Comment, Atkins v. Virginia: The Need for Consistent 
Substantive and Procedural Application of the Ban on Executing the Intellectually Disabled, 90 
DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 743–54 (2012) (discussing requirements in individual states). 
 10. This is of particular concern in jurisdictions where judges are elected. See Lynn 
Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law But an Essential 
Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 380, 386–88 (2012) (discussing the impact of popular law-and-order 
sentiment on elected state judges); Bright, supra note 2, at 10–18 (“The greatest threat to the rule 
of law comes from those judges who remain on courts, but refuse to enforce the law in instances 
when an unpopular outcome could jeopardize their careers.”); Maura Dolan, Clashing Courts: 
Law Restricts Federal Judges’ Ability to Intervene in State Criminal Cases, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 
2015), http://www.latimes.com /local/crime/la-me-courts-clash-20150906-story.html (observing 
that in close habeas cases, California courts tend to affirm convictions). 
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interpretations of it, which have severely limited state petitioners’ 
opportunity for federal review. Particularly concerning for Atkins 
petitioners is the inability of federal courts to review most state court 
decisions related to federal law, including constitutional violations, 
unless the Supreme Court has directly held on the issue.11 Despite 
these restrictions, the Court’s recent decision in Brumfield v. Cain12 
may harken a new era, in which a federal court sitting in habeas may 
consider the adequacy of a state court’s fact-finding procedures. 
Kevan Brumfield was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death in 1995, seven years before the Supreme Court 
decided Atkins.13 Following Atkins, Brumfield petitioned the state 
court for habeas review, seeking a hearing to demonstrate that his 
sentence was unconstitutional because he was intellectually 
disabled.14 The court denied Brumfield’s requests for funding or time 
to obtain a pro bono expert to develop his argument, so Brumfield 
based his petition on evidence presented during the mitigation phase 
of his criminal trial, before intellectual disability was at issue.15 The 
state habeas court denied him an Atkins hearing16 and relief, finding 
that Brumfield did not present sufficient evidence to raise the issue 
of intellectual disability.17 
Brumfield then sought federal habeas review.18 He claimed that 
he was eligible for relief for two reasons: (1) the state habeas court 
had unreasonably applied federal due process law by denying him 
opportunity for fact-development in the form of funding or time to 
obtain an expert, and (2) the state habeas court had made 
unreasonable findings of fact based on the record before it.19 The 
district court agreed on both counts and, after holding an evidentiary 
hearing on intellectual disability, found Brumfield to be intellectually 
disabled and thus ineligible for the death penalty.20 The Fifth Circuit 
 
 11. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 12. 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015). 
 13. See id. at 2273–74. 
 14. Id. at 2273. 
 15. Id. at 2274–75. 
 16. An Atkins hearing is a hearing to determine whether a capital defendant suffers from 
intellectual disability and is thus ineligible for capital punishment. See id. at 2274. 
 17. Id. at 2275. Intellectual disability is defined under Louisiana law as “a disability 
characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior as 
expressed in conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. The onset must occur before the age 
of eighteen years.” LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(1) (2012). 
 18. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2272. 
 19. Id. at 2275. 
 20. Id. 
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reversed, and the Supreme Court granted Brumfield’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari.21 The Court held that the state habeas court’s 
findings were unreasonable and that those findings were the basis of 
the court’s denial of Brumfield’s petition for an Atkins hearing.22 
Though the Court declined to address whether the state court had 
unreasonably applied federal due process law, it considered 
Brumfield’s lack of opportunity for fact development in concluding 
that the state court’s findings were unreasonable.23 
This Comment suggests that petitioners with intellectual 
disabilities are uniquely at risk of cruel and unusual punishment due 
to the narrowness of the Court’s reading of AEDPA and due to 
limited Supreme Court precedent effectuating Atkins. Brumfield 
contains no new general pronouncement of law, and its holding is 
fact-specific, relating primarily to Louisiana law and the specific 
evidence that Brumfield presented. Yet the decision permits 
argument that courts should consider the fact-development 
opportunities of petitioners, particularly those sentenced to death 
before Atkins. Brumfield will not likely create significant procedural 
protections for petitioners. It may, however, mark the beginning of a 
broader reading of a previously underdeveloped section of AEDPA: 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of federal 
habeas review and Supreme Court interpretations of AEDPA. Part III 
discusses the constitutional exemption of the intellectually disabled 
from capital punishment. Part IV sets forth the factual background of 
Brumfield and the rationale underlying the Court’s opinion. Part V 
discusses Justice Thomas’s dissent and analyzes the propriety of the 
Court’s holding. Part VI concludes, focusing on the potential impact 
of Brumfield on future petitions for federal habeas review, 
particularly those following the denial of Atkins hearings. 
II.  THE FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AEDPA 
The writ of habeas corpus was created to protect individuals 
from unjust or unconstitutional incarceration or execution.24 It is 
 
 21. Id. at 2276. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2281–82. 
 24. See Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., Preface at 
xli (2015) (“Prior to AEDPA taking effect in 1996, the federal courts provided a final safeguard 
for the relatively rare but compelling cases where the state courts had allowed a miscarriage of 
justice to occur.”); Adelman, supra note 10, at 382. 
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known as the “Great Writ” and traces its history back to the Magna 
Carta.25 The Framers considered habeas review to be so important 
that they included in the Constitution the Suspension Clause, which 
prevents the suspension of the writ except in narrow circumstances.26 
The ability of federal petitioners to challenge federal detention was 
codified shortly thereafter.27 
With the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, Congress extended to 
state prisoners the ability to petition for federal habeas review.28 
While the writ has an illustrious history, federal habeas review of 
state detention has been met with antipathy as a result of its 
perceived conflict with states’ fundamental police power.29 Since 
federal review of state detention became available, those concerned 
with the principles of federalism, state sovereignty, and finality of 
judgments have sought to limit the doctrine.30 In response to this 
sentiment and the attacks on the World Trade Center and Oklahoma 
City, Congress passed and President Clinton signed AEDPA into law 
in 1996.31 
 
 25. Adelman, supra note 10, at 380. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or invasion the public Safety may require it.”); see 
generally Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 992–99 (2012) 
(explaining that the scope of the Suspension Clause remains ambiguous). 
 27. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
443, 446–47 (2007) (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82). 
 28. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385). It was not until well into the 20th 
century that the Supreme Court interpreted the act to allow a state court conviction to be 
collaterally attacked. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996). 
 29. Adelman, supra note 10, at 382; see Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) 
(“Federal habeas review of state convictions frustrates both the States’ sovereign power to punish 
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. It disturbs the State’s 
significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some 
admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of 
federal judicial authority.”) (citations omitted) (quoting another source); John H. Blume, AEDPA: 
The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 263 (2006) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
U.S. 545, 585 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)); Timothy J. Foley, The New 
Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 193, 193–94 (1989) (“The review of state detentions through a federal habeas 
proceeding is alternatively embraced as a vindication of essential liberties, sweeping aside 
procedural impediments and curing injustice, or criticized as an encroachment on state court 
integrity preventing finality and clogging federal dockets.”). 
 30. Kovarsky, supra note 27, at 459 (discussing the history of Congress’s sentiment toward 
the writ of habeas corpus); see Blume, supra note 29, at 263–64 (discussing the intense debate 
surrounding habeas review of state decisions review). 
 31. Charles Doyle, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary, CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS (June 3, 1996), http://www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/laws/majorlaw/96 
-499.htm; see Williams v. Taylor (Michael Williams), 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). But see 
Kovarsky, supra note 27, at 447, 457–58, 471 (arguing that “AEDPA’s legislative history lacks 
evidence sufficient to extract a generalized purpose to promote comity, finality, and federalism;” 
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Under AEDPA, a federal court may entertain the petition of a 
state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”32 
Furthermore, § 2254(d) bars litigation of any claim already 
adjudicated on the merits in state court, subject to the exceptions of 
§§ 2254(d)(1) and (2).33 Therefore, relitigation is permitted only if 
the state proceeding: 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 
in the State court proceeding.34 
The Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA to permit relief in 
limited circumstances.35 According to the Court, “AEDPA 
recognizes a foundational principle of our federal system: State 
courts are adequate forums for the vindication of federal rights.”36 
Some argue that the Court’s interpretation of the statute has been 
more restrictive than the statutory language requires and than 
Congress intended.37 Supreme Court decisions have clarified and 
narrowed the opportunity for relief under § 2254(d)(1), while leaving 
§ 2254(d)(2) relatively unaddressed.38 A brief survey of this case law 
 
that these principles are conflicting; and that the habeas corpus clauses were opportunistically 
added to a statute on terrorism that “few legislators dared oppose”). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012). 
 33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
 35. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (explaining that § 2254(d) sets forth a 
“highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state-court 
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”) (quoting another source). 
 36. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13, 15 (2013) (holding that federal courts must apply a 
doubly deferential standard of review on habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
(i.e., deference to the attorney and deference to the state court)); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 
1388, 1401 (2011) (quoting another source) (“[Section] 2254(d)(1) . . . carries out AEDPA’s goal 
of promoting comity, finality, and federalism by giving state courts the first opportunity to review 
a claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance.”). 
 37. See Wiseman, supra note 26, at 960; Kovarsky, supra note 27, at 446–47;; see also 
Krista A. Dolan, The § 2254 Trinity: How the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Richter, Pinholster, 
and Greene Have Interpreted Federal Review into Near Nonexistence, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF 49, 52 
(2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2254 so narrowly that it has nearly 
eliminated federal review.”); Blume, supra note 29, at 260. But see Bright, supra note 2, at 8–9 
(discussing the Court’s restrictions on federal habeas relief even before AEDPA). 
 38. Christy H. DeSanctis, Brumfield v. Cain, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (OCT. TERM 
2014) (2015), http://www.gwlr.org/brumfield-v-cain/ (citing Nancy J. King et al., Habeas Corpus 
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highlights the restrictions on petitions and demonstrates why 
Brumfield, though its holding is factually specific, has the potential 
to impact future habeas litigation and may allow for more federal 
review than previously existed for petitioners claiming to be exempt 
from execution under Atkins. 
In Harrington v. Richter,39 the Supreme Court held that a state 
court’s summary denial of a habeas petition is a decision on the 
merits, and is therefore subject to § 2254(d).40 When a state petition 
has been summarily denied, the petitioner bears the burden of 
demonstrating that “there was no reasonable basis” for the state 
court’s decision.41 This puts a significant burden on the petitioner to 
discredit each possible explanation for the denial in order to obtain 
federal review.42 With such a burden on petitioners, state courts that 
summarily deny petitions are likely to receive greater deference 
under § 2254(d) than those that explain their denial.43 
In Williams v. Taylor,44 the Supreme Court clarified its 
interpretation of the first exception to § 2254(d)’s bar on relitigation: 
Section 2254(d)(1). This section states that “a decision that was 
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” can be 
reviewed by a federal court.45 Williams held that “clearly established 
Federal law” includes only holdings, not dicta, from previous 
Supreme Court cases.46 Thus, unless the Supreme Court has 
explicitly held on the issue that is before the state court, a federal 
court cannot review the state court decision under (d)(1). 
Williams further held that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable 
application of” clauses of subsection (d)(1) are independent of one 
 
Litigation in United States District Courts: An Empirical Study, 2000–2006 (2006), 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/21200). 
 39. 562 U.S. 86 (2011). 
 40. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011); see also Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 
1088, 1091–92 (2013) (extending this ruling to decisions in which the state court addresses some 
but not all of the petitioner’s claims, including those under § 2254(d)(2)). 
 41. Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 
 42. Dolan, supra note 37, at 53. 
 43. See Dolan, supra note 37, at 53 (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 102–03 (“Without knowing 
how a state court applied the law, it seems impossible to determine whether that application is 
‘unreasonable.’ Unless a federal court finds it impossible for a state court’s application to be 
reasonable, Richter has made state court decisions per se reasonable.”) (emphasis in original). 
 44. Williams v. Taylor (Terry Williams), 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (O’Connor, J., opinion of the 
Court as to Part II). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 46. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. 
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another.47 Though a petitioner will often argue that both clauses 
permit federal review in his case, each clause has its own elements 
that the petitioner must satisfy.48 
The Court explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” 
federal law, thereby permitting federal habeas review under the first 
clause of subsection (d)(1), in one of two scenarios: (1) “if the state 
court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [a 
Supreme Court case],” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of 
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the 
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from 
[that] precedent.”49 The first scenario will only arise when the 
applied law is “substantially different from the relevant precedent of 
[the] Court.”50 Because case facts are almost always distinguishable 
and AEDPA requires significant deference to state court decisions, a 
petition based on the second scenario will rarely succeed.51 
The “unreasonable application” clause of subsection (d)(1) 
applies when “a state court has misapplied a ‘governing legal 
principle’ to ‘a set of facts different from those of the case in which 
the principle was announced.”52 The Court has clarified that the state 
court’s application of a Supreme Court holding must be erroneous, 
incorrect, and objectively unreasonable to permit relief under the 
unreasonable application clause.53 Application that is merely 
erroneous and incorrect is insufficient to obtain review.54 
Additionally, the degree of specificity of the rule can impact whether 
its application was “unreasonable.”55 The Court observed that “[t]he 
 
 47. Id. at 405. 
 48. See, e.g., id. at 367; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 72 (2006). 
 49. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06. 
 50. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 (1976)) 
(accepting “‘diametrically different,’ ‘opposite in character or nature,’ or ‘mutually opposed’” as 
the appropriate definition of “contrary” for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)). 
 51. Ursula Bentele, The Not So Great Writ: Trapped in the Narrow Holdings of Supreme 
Court Precedents, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 741, 754 (2010) (“If a habeas petitioner must 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court has ‘clearly established’ the law applicable to his particular 
factual circumstance, relief pursuant to AEDPA will not only be severely curtailed, but applied in 
an arbitrary way simply by the happenstance of the small number of cases granted direct review 
in the Supreme Court.”). 
 52. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63, 76 (2003)). 
 53. Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). 
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more general the rule, the more leeway [state] courts have in 
reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”56 
Overarching the § 2254(d)(1) analysis rests Cullen v. 
Pinholster,57 in which the Supreme Court held that federal habeas 
“review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before 
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”58 The Court 
focused on the “backward-looking language” of the statute and the 
great deference owed to state habeas decisions.59 The Court 
concluded that “[i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze 
whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that 
unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state 
court.”60 Pinholster therefore increases the importance of fact 
development in state court for sustaining a petitioner’s federal 
claim.61 
Having considered the “contrary to” and “unreasonable 
application of” clauses of § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner is left with a 
third and final path past § 2254(d)’s bar on relitigation: § 2254(d)(2). 
This section permits federal review when the state court’s decision 
was based on unreasonable findings of fact.62 A claim seeking relief 
under § 2254(d)(2) involves an inquiry dependent on the evidence 
presented at the state habeas court.63 The Court has held that “a state-
court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the 
federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the 
first instance.”64 To be subject to federal review under (d)(2), the 
state court finding must be objectively unreasonable, such that 
reasonable minds could not disagree on the matter.65 Subsection 
(d)(2) has remained poorly developed, as few Supreme Court cases 
 
 56. Id. (quoting another source). 
 57. 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
 58. Id. at 1398. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1399. But see id. at 1413 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s novel 
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1), however, federal courts must turn a blind eye to new evidence in 
deciding whether a petitioner has satisfied § 2254(d)(1)’s threshold obstacle to federal habeas 
relief—even when it is clear that the petitioner would be entitled to relief in light of that 
evidence.”). 
 61. Wiseman, supra note 26, at 958, 972–77. 
 62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012). 
 63. See id. 
 64. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). 
 65. Id. (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)) (quoting another source). 
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have been decided on subsection (d)(2) grounds and each decision is 
inherently fact-specific.66  
No one denies the importance of the life and liberty rights at 
issue in habeas petitions. Yet AEDPA’s strong deference to state 
court decisions has left federal judges sitting in habeas with little 
ability to overturn unconstitutional decisions and convictions they 
believe to be wrongful.67 Judge Kozinski has called attention to the 
impact of AEDPA: 
Hidden in [AEDPA’s] interstices was a provision that has 
pretty much shut out the federal courts from granting 
habeas relief in most cases, even when they believe that an 
egregious miscarriage of justice has occurred.
 
We now 
regularly have to stand by in impotent silence, even though 
it may appear to us that an innocent person has been 
convicted.
 
Not even the Supreme Court may act on what it 
believes is a constitutional violation if the issue is raised in 
a habeas petition as opposed to on direct appeal.68 
Because of the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of 
subsection (d)(1), federal courts are vastly limited in their ability to 
rule on a constitutional issue on habeas review of a state decision if 
the Court has not already ruled on the same issue on direct review.69 
Brumfield’s potential impact on subsection (d)(2) will be addressed 
after a discussion on intellectual disability and capital punishment. 
III.  INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
The Court has long observed that the death penalty should be 
reserved for the most serious offenses and the most culpable 
individuals.70 Initially, this policy protected “lunatics and idiots,”71 
 
 66. See DeSanctis, supra note 38; see, e.g., Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S. Ct. 611, 611 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority’s denial of the acting warden’s petition 
for writ of certiorari because the Ninth Circuit had set forth “an avalanche of evidence 
demonstrating that the state court’s factual finding was unreasonable”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 
U.S. 231 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 67. See Kozinski, supra note 24, Preface at xli. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In all events, 
it seems to me the case as presented to us here does call for a new rule, perhaps justified as much 
as a preventative measure as by the urgent needs of the situation. That rule should be explored in 
the court system, and then established in this Court before it can be grounds for relief in the 
procedural posture of this case.”). 
 70. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 (1980) (concluding that the petitioner 
was ineligible for the death penalty because it “cannot be said [that his crimes] reflected a 
consciousness materially more ‘depraved’ than that of any person guilty of murder”); Lockett v. 
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while those with milder intellectual disabilities remained eligible for 
the death penalty.72 Atkins v. Virginia73 changed this. The Court 
considered “evolving standards of decency” in determining whether 
execution of those with intellectual disabilities constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.74 The Court 
reasoned that “[b]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, 
judgment, and control of their impulses,” the intellectually disabled 
cannot act with the degree of moral culpability requisite to justify the 
ultimate retribution of capital punishment.75 Furthermore, the 
diminished cognitive capacity of such individuals renders them less 
likely to be deterred by the threat of capital punishment.76 The Court 
also reasoned that a defendant with intellectual disabilities faces a 
special danger of a harsher-than-warranted penalty because he is less 
likely to be capable of assisting in his own defense and is more likely 
to give a false confession.77 Therefore, the Court held the death 
penalty to be an unconstitutional punishment for those with 
intellectual disabilities.78 
The Court observed that “[t]o the extent there is a serious 
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is 
in determining which offenders are in fact retarded.”79 The Court did 
not define “intellectual disability” or establish procedures to evaluate 
capital defendants who claimed to be intellectually disabled.80 
Instead, the Court  left these critical determinations to the states, with 
the recommendation that they consider the guidelines of the 
American Association of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities 
 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (holding Ohio death penalty statute unconstitutional for not 
permitting individualized determinations of culpability). Compare Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 598 (1977) (holding capital punishment to be “an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as 
such, does not take human life”), with Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (Powell, J., dissenting) (reflecting 
that some rapists may be more deliberate and vicious than murderers). 
 71. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES **24–25). 
 72. See id. at 340. 
 73. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 74. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
 75. Id. at 306, 319 (“If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the 
most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded 
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.”). 
 76. Id. at 320. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 321. 
 79. Id. at 317. 
 80. Id. 
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(AAIDD)81 and the American Psychiatric Association (APA).82 
Accordingly, most states followed the Court’s suggestion and now 
define intellectual disability with the following three elements: 
(1) intellectual functioning, (2) adaptive functioning, and (3) age of 
onset.83 States, however, vary in terms of the criteria used to define 
each element of intellectual disability and the procedures to identify 
whether an individual meets those criteria.84 This difference in 
definitions “creates disparity amongst the states whereby a defendant 
executed in one state could have been considered intellectually 
disabled and thus ineligible for execution in another.”85 
In State v. Williams,86 the Louisiana Supreme Court set forth the 
state’s definition of intellectual disability as well as its procedures for 
determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled.87 
Williams applied the three elements identified in the AAIDD and 
APA guidelines to define intellectual disability as requiring (1) sub-
average intellectual functioning, (2) significant impairment in 
adaptive functioning, and (3) manifestations of this disorder in the 
developmental stage.88 Williams further directed lower courts to look 
to the procedures for pre-trial competency hearings for guidance.89 
Those procedures indicated that the petitioner must “raise a 
reasonable doubt” as to intellectual disability to be granted an Atkins 
hearing.90 
Under Williams, an individual sentenced to death will not 
automatically be entitled to an Atkins hearing; such a hearing will be 
granted only if the individual defendant bears his burden of 
providing “objective factors that will put at issue the fact of mental 
 
 81. The AAIDD was previously known as the American Association of Mental Retardation. 
About Us, AAIDD, http://aaidd.org/about-aaidd (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). 
 82. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3, 317 n.22. 
 83. Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumventing Both the 
Letter and the Spirit of the Court’s Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 226–27 (2008); see 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, 
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 108 (2009). 
 84. Raffensperger, supra note 9, at 743–47; see, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
905.5.1(C) (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b) (West 2013). 
 85. Cheung, supra note 9, at 319. 
 86. 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835. 
 87. Id. at 858–59; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2012). Louisiana codified the 
criteria set forth in State v. Williams, though the Brumfield parties agree that Williams continues 
to provide the procedure for determining intellectual disability in Louisiana. Brumfield v. Cain, 
135 S. Ct. 2269, 2284 n.2 (2015). 
 88. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 852–54. 
 89. Id. at 858 n.33. 
 90. Id. 
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retardation.”91 While the court set forth the State’s evidence that 
Williams was “street smart” and that the defendant’s own expert 
witness said that Williams was not intellectually disabled, the court 
did not consider this evidence in reaching its decision regarding 
whether Williams was entitled to a hearing.92 It only considered 
whether Williams’ evidence met his burden.93 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly indicate the 
retroactive nature of Atkins, the Louisiana Supreme Court observed 
that this bar on execution must provide individuals already sentenced 
an opportunity to seek habeas relief on the ground that they are 
intellectually disabled.94 Yet courts and scholars have expressed 
concern for those convicted prior to Atkins, given that those with 
intellectual disabilities may have previously sought to hide such a 
condition.95 In Atkins, the Court contemplated the “two-edged 
sword” faced by defendants who presented evidence of intellectual 
disability for mitigation purposes: such evidence could cause the jury 
to view the defendant as less culpable, though it could also cause the 
jury to find the aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness.96 
With this risk, there was no guarantee that an intellectually disabled 
petitioner would have introduced such evidence into the record prior 
to Atkins.97 
In addition, the federal Supreme Court has been slow to identify 
safeguards necessary to effectuate Atkins’ bar on execution of the 
intellectually disabled. The Court has rendered only one decision 
since Atkins that clarifies the definition of intellectual disability. In 
Hall v. Florida,98 the Court held that a state law that precluded 
capital defendants with IQ scores exceeding 70 from being defined 
as intellectual disabled was unconstitutional.99 The Court reasoned 
 
 91. Id. at 857. In California, by comparison, a defendant needs a sworn affidavit from an 
expert identifying the defendant as suffering from an intellectual disability in order to obtain a 
hearing on the matter. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(b)(1) (West 2013). 
 92. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 855, 857. 
 93. Id. at 857. 
 94. Id. at 851–52 n.21 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). 
 95. Id. at 856 n.31. 
 96. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Michael L. Perlin, “Life in Mirrors, 
Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 338–39 (2003). 
 97. See Williams, 831 So. 2d at 856–57 (“Atkins changed what would be considered 
relevant. Prior to the trial, mental retardation was merely a factor in mitigation. Post Atkins, 
mental retardation is a complete prohibition against imposition of the death penalty according to 
the United States Supreme Court.”). 
 98. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 99. Id. at 1990. 
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that the law created “an unacceptable risk that persons with 
intellectual disability will be executed.”100 The Court reiterated: “No 
legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with 
intellectual disability;” the deterrent and retributive purposes of the 
death penalty are ill-served by executing those with diminished logic, 
impulse control, and moral culpability.101 But the Court remained 
silent regarding the procedures required to identify a person as 
intellectually disabled.102 
AEDPA poses a special challenge to fully implementing Atkins. 
Since the Court left to the states the tasks of defining intellectual 
disability and developing procedures for determining it, Atkins 
provides a hollow holding for federal courts to entertain an Atkins 
petition under the strictures of § 2254(d)(1) precedent. Because the 
Court proscribed neither a definition of “intellectual disability” nor 
the procedures for courts to follow, there is no “clearly established 
Federal law” to permit federal habeas review under (d)(1).103 When 
sitting in habeas, federal courts thus have little ability to review the 
constitutionality of state implementation of Atkins.104 This procedural 
limitation poses significant problems for those sentenced before 
Atkins in states with more stringent and potentially unconstitutional 
statutes.105 Given this barrier to relief under (d)(1), petitioners 
claiming intellectual disability may then look to (d)(2) for procedural 
safeguards and, after Brumfield, may find more relief. 
IV.  BRUMFIELD V. CAIN 
Brumfield v. Cain brought a new challenge to the Court: whether 
a state habeas court’s denial of a death row inmate’s petition for 
habeas review—after the court had denied the petitioner the 
opportunity to develop the claim and denied him an Atkins hearing—
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1992–93 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320). 
 102. See Perlin, supra note 96, at 315 (“Atkins gives us a blueprint with which to work, but 
we must remain vigilant to make sure that it does not become merely a ‘paper victory.’”). 
 103. Nathaniel Koslof, Insurmountable Hill: How Undue AEDPA Deference Has 
Undermined the Atkins Ban on Executing the Intellectually Disabled, 54 B.C. L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 189, 193 (2013); see discussion supra Part II.A. 
 104. See Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The 
Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 230 (2008) (“As long as the state courts do not stray far from 
Supreme Court precedent, AEDPA prevents the federal courts from interfering.”). 
 105. Koslof, supra note 103, at 194; see, e.g., Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1360 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (upholding Georgia’s intellectual disability standard, which exempts from the death 
penalty only those who prove intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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was subject to federal review as the result of an unreasonable factual 
determination under § 2254(d)(2) or whether this decision was 
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly 
established law under (d)(1).106 The Court concluded that the state 
habeas court’s decision was the result of unreasonable factual 
determinations, so federal habeas review was proper under (d)(2).107 
It therefore vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.108 
A.  Factual and Procedural History 
This case arose from the murder of Baton Rouge police officer 
Corporal Betty Smothers.109 In 1993, Smothers had a second job as a 
security officer at a grocery store.110 At the end of each day, 
Smothers escorted the store’s assistant manager Kimen Lee to a local 
bank to make the grocery store’s deposit.111 On one such occasion, 
Kevan Brumfield and an accomplice attacked Smothers and Lee.112 
Brumfield shot Smothers five times in the forearm, chest, and 
head.113 Lee took control of the police cruiser and drove to a nearby 
convenience store, where she called for help.114 Corporal Smothers 
died from her injuries.115 
A jury convicted Brumfield of first-degree murder and 
sentenced him to death.116 Brumfield’s sentence was affirmed on 
direct appeal, and in 2000 he filed a petition for state habeas 
review.117 Following Louisiana’s implementation of Atkins in State v. 
Williams,118 Brumfield amended his petition to include a request for 
an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate intellectual disability, setting 
forth all relevant mitigation evidence gathered in his sentencing 
hearing.119 Brumfield also requested “all the resources necessary to 
the proper presentation of his case,” contending that it would be 
 
 106. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015). 
 107. Id. at 2273. 
 108. Id. at 2283. 
 109. Id. at 2273. 
 110. Id. at 2284 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2288. 
 118. 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835; see discussion supra Part III. 
 119. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2274 (majority opinion). 
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premature for the court to deny his petition before he had the 
opportunity to retain an expert.120 
The state habeas court denied Brumfield’s funding requests, 
denied his requests for time to obtain a pro bono expert, and denied 
him a hearing.121 Brumfield had no choice but to rest his Atkins claim 
on mitigation evidence presented at his criminal trial, before 
intellectual disability was at issue.122 The court considered the 
petition and the mitigation evidence: transcripts of testimony of Dr. 
Bolter, a clinical neuropsychologist who had performed tests on 
Brumfield, and testimony of a social worker who had gathered 
Brumfield’s history by consulting records and interviewing family 
members and teachers.123 In dismissing Brumfield’s petition, the 
court concluded: 
Dr. Bolter in particular found [Brumfield] had an IQ of 
over—or 75. Dr. Jordan124 actually came up with a little bit 
higher IQ. I do not think that the defendant has 
demonstrated impairment based on the record in adaptive 
skills. The doctor testified that he did have an anti-social 
personality or sociopath [sic], and explained it as someone 
with no conscience, and the defendant hadn’t carried his 
burden placing the claim of mental retardation at issue. 
Therefore, I find he is not entitled to that hearing based on 
all those things that I just set out.125 
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily denied Brumfield’s 
application for a supervisory writ, and in November 2004 Brumfield 
filed with the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana 
a petition for federal habeas review, grounded in part on his request 
for an Atkins hearing.126 
Once in federal court, Brumfield received funds to develop his 
Atkins claim for the first time.127 The district court held that the state 
 
 120. Id. at 2275. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Dr. Jordan did not testify at Brumfield’s trial, and it is disputed whether his statements 
were made part of the record. See id. at 2278; id. at 2289 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 2275 (majority opinion). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (M.D. La. 2012). On the recommendation 
of the magistrate, the district court held an evidentiary hearing, the propriety of which the State 
challenged. Id. Upon reviewing the issue, the district court found that the hearing was proper. Id. 
at 384. 
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habeas court’s denial of the opportunity to obtain an expert was an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal due process 
law.128 The court lamented that “the state court denied Brumfield 
even an opportunity to develop his prima facie case.”129 This 
satisfied the court that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) should allow federal 
review of the merits of Brumfield’s claim.130 The court further held 
that the state habeas court’s decision was based on findings that were 
unreasonable because, among other reasons, Brumfield was forced to 
rely on information gathered before intellectual disability was at 
issue.131 The court held that this satisfied § 2254(d)(2).132 
The State appealed, arguing that the district court had not 
appropriately deferred to the state habeas court.133 The Fifth Circuit 
agreed, reversing the district court’s ruling and holding that 
Brumfield’s federal habeas petition was barred because it failed to 
satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2).134 The circuit court 
rejected the district court’s § 2254(d)(1) holding because no Supreme 
Court precedent required a state court to grant an Atkins petitioner 
funds to make a threshold showing of intellectual disability.135 The 
circuit court also rejected the district court’s § 2254(d)(2) holding, 
explaining that the state habeas court had considered and rejected the 
evidence of intellectual and adaptive impairment.136 The Fifth 
Circuit, therefore, found that Brumfield did not successfully clear 
§ 2254(d)’s bar on relitigation and must be denied habeas relief.137 
The Supreme Court granted Brumfield’s petition for a writ of 
certiorari as to both §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).138 
 
 128. Id. at 376–77. 
 129. Id. at 377 (emphasis in original). 
 130. Id. at 378. 
 131. Id. at 380. The district court also considered the following in concluding that the state 
court’s findings were unreasonable: (1) the state court had notice of the inadequacy of 
Brumfield’s opportunity for fact-development; (2) the decision improperly rested on the 
subjective adaptive skills prong; (3) rendering findings of adaptive skill was unreasonable, given 
that the pre-Atkins evidence did not dovetail with the Louisiana’s factors for intellectual 
disability; and (4) it was improper to collapse a competency inquiry into an intellectual disability 
inquiry. Id. at 380–83. 
 132. Id. at 383. 
 133. Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 134. Id. at 927. 
 135. Id. at 925–26 (describing the district court’s holding as “an unwarranted extension of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence”). 
 136. Id. at 926. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (granting writ of certiorari). 
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B.  The Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court held that the state habeas court’s denial of 
Brumfield’s Atkins claim without affording him an evidentiary 
hearing or granting him opportunity to secure expert evidence “was 
‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”139 Because the 
Court held for Brumfield on his § 2254(d)(2) claim, it declined to 
address whether the state habeas court’s refusal to grant him the 
opportunity to develop his threshold showing was “contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established law” under 
§ 2254(d)(1).140 
The Court focused its analysis on the two factual determinations 
underlying the state habeas court’s decision to deny Brumfield an 
Atkins hearing: (1) “that Brumfield’s IQ score was inconsistent with 
a diagnosis of intellectual disability,” and (2) “that he had presented 
no evidence of adaptive impairment.”141 The Court did “not question 
the propriety of the legal standard the [state] court applied, and 
presume[d] that a rule according an evidentiary hearing only to those 
capital defendants who raise a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to their 
intellectual disability [was] consistent with [its] decision in 
Atkins.”142 The Court concluded that, given the record before the 
state habeas court, both of these material factual determinations were 
unreasonable.143 
As the Court observed, Brumfield had presented to the state 
court evidence suggesting, among other things, that he had registered 
an IQ score of 75, had a fourth-grade reading level, had been 
prescribed numerous medications and treated at psychiatric hospitals 
as a child, had been identified as having some form of learning 
disability, and had been placed in special education classes.144 
First, the Court considered the state habeas court’s finding that 
Brumfield’s IQ score of approximately 75, “necessarily precluded 
any possibility that he possessed subaverage intelligence . . . .”145 
The Court looked to Louisiana state precedent to inform its 
 
 139. Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2273 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) 
(2012)). 
 140. Id. at 2288–89 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) (quoting another source). 
 141. Id. at 2276–77. 
 142. Id. at 2276. 
 143. Id. at 2277. 
 144. Id. at 2275. 
 145. Id. at 2277. 
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determination that an IQ of 75 “was entirely consistent with 
intellectual disability,” and that the state habeas court’s conclusion to 
the contrary was unreasonable.146 Furthermore, the Court disagreed 
with the suggestion that evidence that psychologist Dr. Brian Jordan, 
who did not test Brumfield’s IQ, thought Brumfield’s IQ may be “a 
little higher” than 75, was sufficient “to preclude the possibility that 
Brumfield possesses subaverage intelligence.”147 
Next, the Court considered the state habeas court’s conclusion 
that “the record failed to raise any question as to Brumfield’s 
‘impairment . . . in adaptive skills.’”148 Louisiana statutory law 
explains that adaptive impairment exists if a person suffers 
“substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following 
areas of major life activity:”149 
i. Self-care, 
ii. Understanding and use of language, 
iii. Learning, 
iv. Mobility, 
v. Self-direction, and 
vi. Capacity for independent living.150 
The Court considered the evidence of Brumfield’s weak reading 
skills, placement in special education classes, and suspicion that he 
had a learning disability as indicative of deficiency in “understanding 
and use of language” and “learning,” two of the six areas of life 
activity that Louisiana law considers.151 For the third required 
impairment, the majority relied on evidence of Brumfield’s low birth 
weight,152 commitment to mental health facilities at a young age, and 
administration of antipsychotic and sedative drugs.153 The Court 
concluded that this evidence “indicate[d] that Brumfield may well 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 2272. 
 148. Id. (citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 2279 (citing State v. Williams, 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835, which set 
forth three sets of criteria to determine adaptive functioning, and applying the set of criteria “most 
favorable to the State”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting another source). 
 152. There was expert testimony that low birth weight can place a child at risk of “some form 
of potential neurological trauma . . . .” Id. at 2280. 
 153. Id. 
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have had significant deficits in at least one of the remaining four 
areas.”154 
The Court further observed that Brumfield did not bear the 
burden of proving that he was intellectually disabled or that he was 
likely to prevail on his claim of intellectual disability to be entitled to 
a hearing.155 “Rather, [under Louisiana law,] Brumfield needed only 
to raise a ‘reasonable doubt’ as to his intellectual disability to be 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.”156 The Court observed that “none 
of the countervailing evidence could be said to foreclose all 
reasonable doubt.”157 Considering the disincentives for petitioners to 
introduce evidence of intellectual disability prior to Atkins,158 the 
Court concluded: “[T]he state trial court should have taken into 
account that the evidence before it was sought and introduced at a 
time when Brumfield’s intellectual disability was not at issue. The 
court’s failure to do so resulted in an unreasonable determination of 
the facts.”159 
C.  The Dissent and the (d)(1), (d)(2) Debate 
Justice Thomas wrote the primary dissent, in which he 
contended that the majority misrepresented its decision as being 
under subsection (d)(2) when the majority actually took issue with 
the legal conclusions of the state court; thus, according to the dissent, 
the majority’s decision should have been resolved under (d)(1).160 
The dissent reasoned that rather than disagreeing with the state 
court’s factual determinations, “the majority disagrees with the state 
court’s conclusion that Brumfield had not made a sufficient threshold 
showing of mental retardation to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
 
 154. See id. (referencing the four remaining areas considered in determining impairment in 
adaptive skills: self-care, mobility, self-direction, and capacity for independent living). 
 155. Id. at 2281. 
 156. Id. (quoting State v. Williams, 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835, 858). 
 157. The Court identified two specific pieces of evidence that indicated that Brumfield lacked 
disability. First, “Dr. Bolter stated that Brumfield ‘appears to be normal from a neurocognitive 
perspective,’ with a ‘normal capacity to learn and acquire information when given the opportunity 
for repetition,’ and ‘problem solving and reasoning skills’ that were ‘adequate.’” Id. at 2280–81 
(citations omitted). Second, “the underlying facts of Brumfield’s crime might arguably provide 
reason to think that Brumfield possessed certain adaptive skills, as the murder for which he was 
convicted required a degree of advanced planning and involved the acquisition of a car and guns.” 
Id. at 2281. 
 158. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 159. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2281–82 (discussing the two-edged nature of intellectual 
disability evidence prior to Atkins). 
 160. Id. at 2290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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on his claim.”161 The dissent pointed to the majority’s references to 
state law as evidence of the majority’s improper approach.162 
But the dissent conceded that intellectual disability is a factual 
issue,163 and “that Brumfield’s IQ score [and] adaptive skills . . . are 
facts.”164 In contrast, the dissent argued, the question of whether 
Brumfield should have been granted an Atkins hearing “requires the 
application of law to those facts” because Atkins protects only a 
subset of those with intellectual disabilities, as defined by the states, 
as “legally beyond a State’s power to execute.”165  
Contrary to the assertions of the dissent, the majority correctly 
cast its decision under subsection (d)(2) for three reasons: (1) state 
law had to be considered to determine whether the state habeas 
court’s findings were reasonable; (2) by considering improper 
evidence, the state habeas court’s findings were unreasonable; and 
(3) by ignoring the fact that Brumfield’s evidence was developed 
before Atkins, the state court’s findings were also unreasonable.  
First, a court may look to state law for more reasons than just to 
determine whether the state court misapplied the law.166 Because 
Atkins left the definition of intellectual disability and the procedures 
by which to identify it to the states, state law must be consulted to 
analyze a petition under (d)(2), i.e., to determine (a) whether the 
findings were reasonable based on the state’s criteria and procedures 
and (b) whether the state court’s unreasonable findings were the 
basis of its decision.167 
Thus, contrary to the dissent’s assertions, the Court must look to 
state law to analyze the undisputedly factual inquiries of adaptive 
functioning, intelligence, and age of onset because the criteria for 
 
 161. Id. at 2291 (emphasis in original) (arguing that the majority actually agreed that the state 
habeas court’s factual findings were supported). 
 162. Id. at 2290–91. 
 163. Id. at 2291 n.7. 
 164. Id. at 2291. 
 165. Id. at 2291 & n.7. 
 166. See id. at 2277 n.3 (majority opinion) (“[W]e subject these determinations to review 
under § 2254(d)(2) instead of § 2254(d)(1) because we are concerned here not with the adequacy 
of the procedures and standards the state court applied in rejecting Brumfield’s Atkins claim, but 
with the underlying factual conclusions the court reached when it determined that the record 
evidence was inconsistent with intellectual disability.”). 
 167. See id. (looking “to Louisiana case law only because it provides the framework in which 
these factual determinations were made, and makes clear that the state court’s decision rejecting 
Brumfield’s Atkins claim was premised on those determinations”); Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 25:19–21, 30:12–16, Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (No. 13-1433); cf. Hall v. 
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) (questioning whether Florida’s IQ “cutoff rule” defined 
intellectual disability in such a way that implemented Atkins, and holding that it did not). 
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finding each fact is based in state law.168 For example, it was 
necessary for the Court to look to the various criteria under adaptive 
functioning to determine whether the state court’s finding that 
Brumfield had not presented evidence of low adaptive functioning 
was unreasonable. Even the Fifth Circuit, which ruled against 
Brumfield and was reversed by the Court, noted that “we examine 
Louisiana law to determine whether Brumfield established the 
prerequisites of an Atkins claim,” i.e., whether he had raised the issue 
of intellectual disability.169 
Moreover, the dissent’s argument ignored the statutory language 
that § 2254(d)(2) barred relief “unless the adjudication of the 
claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
determination of the facts.”170 Without looking to Louisiana state 
law, the Court would be unable to discern whether the findings were 
unreasonable, let alone whether they were the basis of the state 
court’s decision to deny Brumfield’s petition, as required to satisfy 
subsection (d)(2). 
Next, the dissent argued that in considering whether (d)(2) bars 
relief, the majority failed to consider the evidence supporting the 
state habeas court’s findings.171 The dissent identified the following 
evidence from the record indicating a possibility that Brumfield did 
not have an intellectual disability: one expert described Brumfield’s 
speech and writing as “intelligible” and “normal;” Brumfield lived 
independently, had a pregnant girlfriend, and chose a life of crime 
after maintaining a job for three months because “his earnings were 
better.”172 Based on this evidence, the dissent concluded that the state 
court was reasonable in finding that Brumfield’s showing did not 
warrant a hearing and that he lacked intellectual disability.173 
A superficial consideration may lead one to conclude that the 
dissent’s reasoning is correct in light of the deference federal courts 
should give state court decisions under AEDPA; the standard under 
§ 2254(d)(2) is not whether the state court’s findings are incorrect 
but whether they are objectively unreasonable.174 Because evidence 
existed indicating that Brumfield lacked adaptive impairment, and 
 
 168. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2291 n.7. 
 169. Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918, 924 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 170. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 171. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). 
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that his intellectual functioning was borderline, AEDPA deference 
would seem to require the Court to deny Brumfield’s request for 
review. 
Yet, under Louisiana law, if a petitioner provides “objective 
factors that will put at issue the fact of mental retardation,” he must 
be granted an Atkins hearing.175 To put “at issue” means to create 
dispute.176 Because Brumfield was required to raise only a factual 
dispute to be entitled to a hearing, the state court was unreasonable to 
consider the State’s evidence and render findings of inconsistency 
with intellectual disability while disregarding the petitioner’s 
evidence. The majority correctly considered all of Brumfield’s 
evidence that supported a finding of intellectual disability.177 
This follows from the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Williams. In that case, the court concluded that Williams had 
presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to an Atkins hearing.178 In 
rendering its decision, the court did not consider the State’s evidence 
that Williams was “street smart” or that Williams’s own expert 
testified that Williams did not have an intellectual disability.179 
Rather, to determine whether Williams was entitled to a hearing, the 
court considered only the evidence supporting a finding of 
intellectual and adaptive functioning, and thus supported a finding of 
intellectual disability.180 
Contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s analysis in Williams, 
the state habeas court failed to make findings based on the evidence 
Brumfield put forward and instead focused almost exclusively on 
evidence put forward by the State that weakened Brumfield’s 
position. The evidence that Brumfield presented put the facts of 
intellectual and adaptive functioning at issue, and the state court’s 
finding of inconsistency with intellectual disability was unreasonable 
without a hearing. 
Finally, the state court’s finding that Brumfield failed to set 
forth sufficient facts for a hearing was unreasonable because 
Brumfield’s evidence was gathered before Atkins, and he was denied 
the opportunity to develop those facts after intellectual disability was 
 
 175. State v. Williams, 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835, 857. 
 176. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “at issue” as “[t]aking 
opposite sides; under dispute; in question . . . .”). 
 177. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2279–80 (majority opinion). 
 178. Williams, 831 So. 2d at 857. 
 179. Id. at 855. 
 180. Id. at 857. 
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an issue.181 The court was on notice of Brumfield’s multiple requests 
for funding or time to hire an expert to help develop his evidence, 
and his lack of opportunity to develop those facts after Atkins’ new 
rule forbidding execution of the intellectually disabled.182 While this 
is certainly a due process issue, and thus could have been addressed 
under (d)(1),183 this consideration goes to the reasonableness of the 
court’s findings as well.184 A lack of basis for factual findings, and a 
denial of the petitioner’s request for opportunity to develop such a 
basis, arguably makes any finding derived from such inadequate 
evidence unreasonable.185 The Court did not hold on this issue 
though it is certainly contemplated in conjunction with the 
holding.186 
In sum, the basis of the state habeas court’s findings was flawed, 
which properly prompted a holding under § 2254(d)(2), rather than 
(d)(1). Based on the evidence that Brumfield presented, the state 
habeas court was unreasonable to find that Brumfield’s IQ score was 
too high for intellectual impairment and that his activities 
demonstrated that he lacked adaptive impairment. Rendering such a 
finding ignored the petitioner’s evidence and his lack of opportunity 
to develop his case while giving weight to State evidence, despite the 
fact that State evidence should not have even been considered. 
Because the Court considered only the issues that implicate the 
reasonableness of the state court’s findings and whether those 
unreasonable findings were the basis of the court’s denial, rather than 
whether the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of federal law, Brumfield was appropriately decided 
under subsection (d)(2). 
 
 181. See Brumfield v. Cain, 854 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (M.D. La. 2012). 
 182. See id. at 378 (“[T]his Court is convinced that the denial of Brumfield’s Atkins claim in 
the state habeas court, coupled with its silent denial of his request for funding to retain experts to 
factually develop his claim, was based on the state habeas court’s unreasonable application of 
clearly established federal due process law as determined by the Supreme Court in Atkins and 
[Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)] (and later confirmed by [Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 
U.S. 930 (2007)]) at the time the state habeas court rendered its decision, in violation of 
§ 2254(d)(1).”). 
 183. Such a claim would likely have been barred by (d)(1), given the lack of Supreme Court 
decisions holding that denying an Atkins petitioner a hearing—let alone funding or opportunity to 
obtain funding—violates his due process rights. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2294–96 
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); supra discussion Part II.A. 
 184. Wiseman, supra note 26, at 984–85. 
 185. See Brumfield, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 380. 
 186. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2273 (majority opinion). 
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V.  BRUMFIELD’S IMPACT 
By reaching its decision under subsection (d)(2), the Court 
opens the door to new argument under this subsection, while leaving 
(d)(1) constrained by prior holdings. During oral argument, the 
Justices repeatedly tried to ascertain the impact that ruling on the 
(d)(2) issue would have.187 As the petitioner argued, “[T]his Court 
need do nothing more than rule that what this [state] judge did in this 
proceeding on this pre-Atkins record was unreasonable.”188 While the 
Court’s holding was based on an application of Louisiana law and 
the finding that Brumfield had presented sufficient evidence to 
warrant a hearing, it has the potential to impact future Atkins 
petitioners in two ways: Brumfield requires (1) some consideration of 
the petitioner’s opportunity to develop his claim and (2) some 
consideration of the weight of the State’s evidence.  
By concluding that Brumfield had set forth sufficient evidence 
to be granted a hearing under Louisiana law, the Court limited its 
holding. After all, Brumfield is unique because the petitioner already 
had expert testimony regarding his intellectual and adaptive 
functioning from his sentencing hearing that supported his petition 
and was sufficient to require an Atkins hearing. As discussed in 
Williams, defense counsel would have presented this evidence at trial 
or sentencing only if he thought it would operate in mitigation of the 
defendant’s culpability. It will not always be the case that an 
intellectually disabled habeas petitioner sentenced prior to Atkins 
would have presented any evidence of intellectual disability.189 
The Court did not end its discussion there. In holding that 
Brumfield set forth sufficient evidence for a hearing, the Court 
considered that Brumfield had not had the opportunity to develop the 
 
 187. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20:23–21:2, 30:12–16, Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 752 
(2014) (No. 13-1433) (Chief Justice Roberts: “I just need to know whether it is simply whether 
the facts in your particular case lead to a particular result, or if there is some more general legal 
rule that you’re arguing for”); id. at 28:4–5 (Justice Alito asking whether there is a “cross-cutting 
legal issue” under the petitioner’s (d)(2) claim); id. at 19:20–21, 20:3–5 (the Chief Justice twice 
more asking what the “broader significance of the question” is); see also Robert Barnes, In Death 
Row Case, Supreme Court Looks for Narrow Ruling, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/in-death-row-case-supreme-court-looks-for 
-narrow-ruling/2015/03/30/9c17715e-d705-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html. 
 188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21:4–7, Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 752 (2014) (No. 
13-1433); cf. id. at 8:1–2 (the petitioner’s counsel stating that he is “not asking for a bright-line 
rule” of when a hearing would be proper under (d)(2)). 
 189. Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2281–82. 
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evidence supporting his claim before Atkins.190 The Court treated this 
as a factor in determining whether the state court’s finding was 
reasonable under (d)(2).191 Therefore, Brumfield strengthens the 
argument that a state habeas court must consider the fact-
development opportunities of the petitioner prior to denying him a 
hearing; if it does not, a federal court may grant review under 
(d)(2).192 While the Supreme Court did not suggest the requirements 
for such fact-finding opportunity,193 and it is unclear how the Court 
would have held if Brumfield had not presented sufficient evidence 
to meet his burden, this new factor in determining whether findings 
of fact are unreasonable could prove to help more Atkins petitioners 
obtain resources to develop their claims. 
On the other hand, the Court’s consideration that the State did 
not present sufficient “countervailing evidence . . . to foreclose all 
reasonable doubt” of intellectual disability194 implies a restriction on 
access to hearings beyond what is required by Louisiana law. It 
leaves room for argument that petitioners may be denied hearings 
even if they put forward evidence of intellectual disability if the State 
puts forward sufficient countervailing evidence to foreclose all 
possibility of intellectual disability.195 While this is contrary to 
Louisiana law, which requires consideration of only the petitioner’s 
evidence,196 it appears to be the antecedent to the low burden on the 
petitioner to raise a mere reasonable doubt of intellectual disability to 
warrant an Atkins hearing. For example, here, if State evidence had 
foreclosed all possible doubt, Brumfield could not have raised a 
 
 190. Id. 
 191. DeSanctis, supra note 38 (“[The Court] folded the [funding] issue into its (d)(2) analysis, 
thus treating it as another factor in determining unreasonableness of the state court’s factual 
determination, as opposed to analyzing it as an alleged violation of clearly established federal law 
under (d)(1).”). 
 192. See id.; Wiseman, supra note 26, at 984–85 (citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 
1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004)) (explaining that (d)(2) may provide further procedural safeguards due to 
the threat of four procedural flaws described by Judge Kozinski: (1) when state courts fail to 
make a finding of fact, (2) when courts mistakenly make factual findings under the wrong legal 
standard, (3) when “the fact-finding process itself is defective,” and (4) when courts “plainly 
misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the misapprehension goes to a 
material factual issue that is central to petitioner’s claim”). 
 193. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2013) (“The death penalty is the gravest 
sentence our society may impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair 
opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution.”). 
 194. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2281. 
 195. See id. (“[I]n light of the evidence of Brumfield’s deficiencies, none of the 
countervailing evidence could be said to foreclose all reasonable doubt.”). 
 196. State v. Williams, 2001-1650 (La. 11/1/02); 831 So. 2d 835, 857. 
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reasonable doubt, and thus a hearing would not have been warranted 
under Louisiana law. Thus, such consideration of countervailing 
evidence should not impact petitioners’ access to federal courts. 
While the full scope of Brumfield’s impact remains unclear, 
Brumfield seems to require, to a certain extent, state courts to 
consider the circumstances of a petitioner in conjunction with the 
evidence he puts forth supporting his petition prior to denying habeas 
review. On balance, Brumfield will likely improve the success of 
petitions under subsection (d)(2) when the petitioner had no 
opportunity to develop facts at the state court prior to the federal 
habeas case. This decision will be particularly important for those 
petitioners sentenced to death before Atkins. If a petitioner now 
claims to have an intellectual disability, a state habeas court should 
be wary of denying the petitioner an opportunity to develop his facts, 
and a federal court should consider the fact-finding opportunities of 
the petitioner. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Consistent with this Comment’s thesis, as of February 2016, 
petitioners remain optimistic that Brumfield stands for greater 
procedural and even substantive protections,197 while federal courts 
have generally constrained their interpretations of Brumfield to the 
facts of the case.198 Some courts have rejected petitioners’ attempts 
to invoke Brumfield, on the grounds that the petitioner was afforded 
an evidentiary hearing and Brumfield is only relevant when the 
 
 197. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 130 A.3d 676, 683 n.9 (Pa. 2015) (rejecting as 
inaccurate the petitioner’s contention that Brumfield “discussed the requirements of a successful 
claim of intellectual disability under Atkins . . . , and, in particular, the age of onset”); Petitioner’s 
Informal Reply in Support of Atkins Petition Execution at 9–10, In re Alfredo Prieto, No. 
S227039 (Cal. Sept. 16, 2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brumfield v. Cain 
constitutes a change of law, and that “Brumfield shows that [the California Supreme Court’s] 
failure to grant [the petitioner] an evidentiary hearing due to a technicality of failing to cite 
California law was unreasonable”); Petitioner’s Reply Brief on the Merits of His Remaining 
Claims at 3:12–14, Kipp v. Woodford, No. 2:99-cv-04973-AB (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (arguing 
that after Brumfield a state court “cannot reasonably deny claims without giving the petitioner 
‘the opportunity to develop the record for purpose of proving’ his claims”). 
 198. See, e.g., Gray v. Zook, 806 F.3d 783, 797 (4th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the petitioner’s 
contention that, for purposes of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Brumfield precluded 
the court from discounting of his evidence when contradicted by the State’s evidence); Butler v. 
Stephens, 625 F. App’x 641, 653 (5th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the petitioner’s interpretation of 
Brumfield as disapproving of the state’s substantive standards for defining intellectual disability). 
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petitioner was denied such a hearing.199 In Prieto v. Zook,200 the 
Fourth Circuit set forth its narrow interpretation of Brumfield: 
The Supreme Court limited its holding in Brumfield to an 
application of Louisiana law to the evidence presented in 
that case. The Court did not purport to alter its prior 
teachings about intellectual disability, procedural default, or 
the actual innocence exception. Rather, the Court simply 
held that the state habeas court’s refusal to grant Brumfield 
an evidentiary hearing on his intellectual disability claim, as 
permitted by Louisiana law, was based on ‘an unreasonable 
determination of the facts’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2).201 
Meanwhile, other courts have interpreted Brumfield to support 
greater opportunity to establish intellectual disability, including for 
petitioners outside of Louisiana. For example, in Smith v. 
Campbell202 the Eleventh Circuit looked to Brumfield as 
“instructive” when remanding for an evidentiary hearing a case in 
which the petitioner had presented some evidence supporting 
intellectual disability.203 In another case, the Eleventh Circuit framed 
the Brumfield state court’s denial of time and funding as material to 
the Court’s holding,204 lending credence to the argument that 
Brumfield stands for greater procedural protections when a petitioner 
 
 199. See, e.g., Henderson v. Stephens, 791 F.3d 567, 586 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Unlike petitioner 
in Brumfield, Henderson had an evidentiary hearing at which he presented expert testimony and 
other evidence in support of his Atkins claim.”); Butler, 625 F. App’x at 653 (same); Marks v. 
Davis, No. CV 11–2458 LHK, 2015 WL 3920073, at *42 n.27 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2015) 
(distinguishing Brumfield from Marks because “the trial court held a ten-day evidentiary hearing 
on [the petitioner’s] Atkins claim, reviewed thousands of pages of documentary evidence, listened 
to the live testimony of six witnesses (five of whom were defense experts), and issued a twenty-
six-page order detailing the bases for its finding that [the petitioner] is not intellectually 
disabled”). But see Oats v. State, 181 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla. 2015) (citing Brumfield as “further 
authority that all three [intellectual disability] prongs generally must be considered in tandem,” 
despite the fact that the petitioner was already afforded an evidentiary hearing). 
 200. 791 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 28 (2015). 
 201. Id. at 472 n.6, quoted in Guevara v. Stephens, No. H-08-1604, 2016 WL 305220, at *6 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2016); see Guevara, 2016 WL 305220, at *7 (“In sum, Brumfield did not 
announce new law or create a new legal standard. Instead, the Supreme Court held that Louisiana 
had failed to apply its own standards for Atkins claims.”). 
 202. 620 F. App’x 734 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 203. Id. at 748–49 & n.21 (holding “the Alabama appellate court’s factual determination—
that the ‘only grounds’ Smith pled were conclusory allegations that he met each of the three 
requirements—is unsupported by the record and therefore unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(2)). 
 204. Kilgore v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corrs., 805 F.3d 1301, 1309 n.5 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding 
Brumfield inapplicable because the petitioner did not challenge any factual findings, nor did he 
raise a § 2254(d)(2) argument). 
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is denied the opportunity to develop his facts prior to an Atkins 
hearing. 
Procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure that only the most 
culpable are sentenced to the ultimate punishment of death. 
Brumfield may indicate that § 2254(d)(2) permits federal review of 
some procedural shortcomings in state habeas court fact-finding, but 
another case must reach the Supreme Court to settle the full extent of 
such requisite procedures. And another case must reach the Supreme 
Court on direct review to settle the substantive and procedural 
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